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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
   
  n April 25, 2011, the Syrian military entered Daraa with a force of up 
to 5,000 men and seven T-55 tanks and began an operation to suppress the 
political opposition there.1 The southern city of Daraa first became the fo-
cus of political opposition to the Assad regime in March 2011 when some 
15 local school children were arrested for painting anti-government slogans 
on the walls of a school.2 Protests spread quickly across the country to Jas-
sem,3 Da’el,4 Sanamein,5 Inkhil6 and then Damascus.7 Government security 
                                                                                                                      
 Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of Exeter.   
1. Syrian Army Attacks Protest City of Daraa, BBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www. 
bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13185185. 
2. Joe Sterling, Daraa: The spark that Lit the Syrian Flame, CNN (Mar. 1, 2012), http:// 
edition.cnn.com/2012/03/01/world/meast/syria-crisis-beginnings/index.html. 
3. Thousands March in Syria, as Fresh Wave of Protests Erupts, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 21, 
2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8395679/Thous 
ands-march-in-Syria-as-fresh-wave-of-protests-erupts.html.  
4. Syrian Security Forces Fire on Protestors; Eight Killed, CNN (May 28, 2011), http:// edi-
tion.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/05/27/syria.unrest/index.html.  
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forces had already responded with the wide-spread detention and torture of 
protesters and, in some cases, live fire.8 Heavy armor was first used on 
April 25, 2011,9 marking the descent into civil war.10  
The ensuing humanitarian consequences for the people of Syria have 
been dreadful.11 Estimates by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) place the number now killed at upwards of 
100,000 people.12 Over five million have been internally displaced13 and 
more than two million people have sought refuge abroad.14 While the in-
tensity of violence has driven some Syrians to seek refuge further afield,15 
                                                                                                                      
5. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Protests Spread Against Assad Rule in Syria REUTERS (Mar. 25, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/25/us-syria-idUSTRE72N2MC2011032 
5.  
6. Katherine Marsh, Syria: Four Killed in Deraa as Protests Spread Across South, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/22/syrian-
protests-troops-kill-deraa.  
7. The Revolution Reaches Damascus, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www. 
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/18/the_revolution_reaches_damascus.  
8. For a narrative timeline of the initial stages of the anti-Assad protest movement see 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WE’VE NEVER SEEN SUCH HORROR”, CRIMES AGAINST HU-
MANITY BY SYRIAN SECURITY FORCES 8–13 (2011), http://www.hrw.org/sites/ de-
fault/files/reports/syria0611webwcover.pdf. 
9. Syrian Army Attacks Protest City of Daraa, supra note 1. 
10. Syrian Arab Republic, in 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 443 (ICRC, 2012), http://www 
.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/annual-report/current/icrc-annual-report-syria.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2013) [hereinafter ICRC 2012 Annual Report] (“What had started out as localized 
clashes between the Syrian government and armed groups in 2011 gradually evolved into a 
non-international armed conflict in 2012.”).  
11. Regular humanitarian bulletins on the situation in Syria are prepared by the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and may be found 
on their Syria Crisis site: http://www.unocha.org/crisis/syria (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  
12. Syria Death Toll Now Above 100,000, Says UN Chief Ban, BBC NEWS (July 25, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23455760.  
13. The most recent statistics on internal displacement in Syria are available at the Syr-
ia page of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/9F19CC00280C471C802570 
A7004CE12F?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  
14. Up to date statistics on “persons of concern” to the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) seeking refuge abroad are available at the Syria Regional 
Refugee Response Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, http://data.unhcr.org/syrian 
refugees/regional.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  
15. Boris Cheshirkov, Bulgaria's Asylum Centres Bursting at the Seams as Syrian Refugees En-
ter Europe, UNHCR (Sept. 17, 2003), http://www.refworld.org/docid/52396d074.html. 
OCHA estimates that a further 28,000 people have now fled to various countries in Eu-
rope, see Syria 34 OCHA HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN 9 (Sept. 10–23, 2013), 
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the vast majority of Syrians remain in the five key countries of refuge sur-
rounding Syria: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.16 Each country 
has responded to the recent influx of civilians fleeing the violence in Syria 
with outstanding generosity. Lebanon, in particular, has consistently main-
tained an open-door policy towards those seeking refugee from the Syrian 
violence.17  The resulting impact on Lebanese society has been marked.18 
As of October 3, 2013, UNHCR estimates that there are now 779,038 Syri-
ans seeking protection in Lebanon, up from some 20,000 in May 2012.19 
This is in addition to the 425,000 Palestinian refugees registered in Leba-
non prior to the war in Syria and the further 50,000 Palestinian refugees 
who arrived in Lebanon following their displacement from refugee camps 
in Syria.20 To put this in some perspective, with the overall Lebanese popu-
lation estimated at 4.2 million,21 the number of refugees in Lebanon now 
amounts to almost a quarter of the total Lebanese population.22  
In these circumstances it would be naïve to expect such generosity to 
persist indefinitely. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Turkey have begun to actively 
limit the number of Syrians permitted to seek refuge on their territory by 
imposing quotas on those allowed to cross the border from Syria each day, 
refusing entry to particular classes as defined in relation to gender and/or 
age or by closing the border altogether.23 Those Syrians prevented from 
                                                                                                                      
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Syria%20Humanitarian%20Bulleti
n%20No%2034.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  
16. A detailed statistical breakdown of the caseload in each country can be found on 
the Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, supra note 14. As of October 3, 2013 there 
were 127,411 Syrian persons of concern in Egypt, 195,068 in Iraq, 536,405 in Jordan, 
779,038 in Lebanon and 502,827 in Turkey. 
17. Inter-agency Regional Response for Syrian Refugees, UNHCR, 1 (Sept. 19–25, 2013), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/52452f244.html.  
18. See Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict, WORLD BANK 
(Report No. 81098, Sept. 20, 2013), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013 
/09/18292074/lebanon-economic-social-impact-assessment-syrian-conflict.  
19. Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, supra note 14. 
20. Id.; Caroline Abu Sa’Da and Michaela Serafini, Humanitarian and Medical Challenges 
of Assisting New Refugees in Lebanon and Iraq, 44 FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW 70 (2013). 
21. Country Profile Lebanon, UNDATA http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?cr 
Name=LEBANON (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  
22. It will, in fact, be a somewhat lower proportion as the most recent estimate of the 
Lebanese population has not yet been corrected to reflect the current influx. Nevertheless, 
the proportion remains extraordinarily high. 
23. Egypt: Do Not Return Asylum Seekers to Syria, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 10, 
2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/10/egypt-do-not-return-asylum-seekers-syria: 
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crossing are left exposed to the worst effects of the conflict and, in particu-
lar, the depredations of the Syrian military, which now seems increasingly 
inclined to directly attack border areas.24 However, States must, nonethe-
less, seek to comply with the legal requirements pertaining to refugees 
within the limits of their capacity. It is therefore, of the first importance to 
identify public international law resources that bind States experiencing a 
refugee influx.  
Any discussion concerning refugees must begin with the right against 
forced return or non-refoulement found in the 1951 Refugee Geneva Conven-
tion.25 This article therefore first examines the terms of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its application in the surrounding States of Egypt, Leba-
non and Turkey (Section II). Particular attention is given to the new (2013) 
Turkish Law on Foreigners,26 which transposes many of the most im-
                                                                                                                      
Without prior warning, on July 8, the Egyptian government changed its entry policy for 
Syrians arriving in Egypt by requiring them to obtain a visa and security clearance before 
arriving in the country. According to media reports, on the same day Egypt denied entry 
to 276 people arriving from Syria, including a plane with Syrian nationals on board, who 
were then flown back to the Syrian town of Latakia. 
 
Jordan: Obama Should Press King on Asylum Seeker Pushbacks, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 
21, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/21/jordan-obama-should-press-king-
asylum-seeker-pushbacks (“Jordan is routinely and unlawfully rejecting Palestinian refu-
gees, single males, and undocumented people seeking asylum at its border with Syria, said 
Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic (the 
Harvard Clinic) today.”); Tom Peter, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq Seek to Stem Syrian Refugee Flood, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (July 14, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com 
/World/Middle-East/2013/0714/Egypt-Jordan-Iraq-seek-to-stem-Syrian-refugee-flood: 
  
While the International Rescue Committee commends Syria’s neighbours for maintaining 
an open borders policy, we are increasingly concerned about reports of Syrians having dif-
ficulty entering Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. The international community should strongly en-
courage hosting governments and the Syrian regime to respect the right of all refugees 
fleeing Syria to ‘seek and enjoy asylum’ and discourage policies – including the closure of 
borders – that prevent civilians from leaving Syria,” says Ned Colt, regional communica-
tions manager for the International Rescue Committee. 
 
Syria, in WORLD REPORT 2013, 609, 612 (Human Rights Watch, 2013), available at http: 
//www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/syria; Abu Sa’Da and Serafini, 
supra note 20, at 70. 
24. Syrian Warplane Attacks Lebanese Border Area, AL-JAZEERA (Aug. 3, 2013), http:// 
www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/20138313050777721.html. 
25. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, Apr. 22, 1954, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention]. 
26.  Law on Foreigners and International Protection Law, 2013, No. 6458 (Turk.) 
[hereinafter Law on Foreigners]. An unofficial English translation of this law prepared by 
UNHCR is available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/5167fbb20.html (last visited Oct. 
8, 2013). 
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portant elements of the 1951 Refugee Convention into Turkish domestic 
law. The section then turns its focus to the so-called “nexus requirement” 
found in the 1951 Convention,27 examining the role this limitation might 
have in the Syrian context. The latter half of the article moves beyond the 
terms of the 1951 Convention to discuss parallel sources of protection, in-
cluding prospects for a regional protection instrument (Section III), the 
principle of non-refoulement in general international human rights law (Sec-
tion IV), customary international law (section V) and international humani-
tarian law (Section VI).  
Only a minority of the States surrounding Syria are party to either the 
1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol to the Convention28 or have passed 
domestic asylum/refugee laws implementing anything like the provisions 
of the Convention in respect of non-refoulement. Even where States are par-
ties to one of the treaties the obligations either remain unimplemented or, 
where relevant domestic legislation has been passed, ineffective for the 
protection of refugees. Nevertheless, reference to both general internation-
al human rights and humanitarian law discloses an extensive set of legal 
norms which, if used effectively, will support a very comprehensive right of 
non-refoulement for individuals displaced from Syria to the surrounding 
States.  
 
II. THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION AND DOMESTIC LAW  
IN THE SURROUNDING STATES 
 
The basic legal instruments for the protection of refugees are the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol to the Convention. Read to-
gether they define the concept of a refugee for the purposes of internation-
al law and set forth the rights attendant to refugee status. A refugee is de-
fined in Article 1(A)2 of the Convention as a person who, 
 
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is un-
willing to avail himself of the protection of that country. . . . 
                                                                                                                      
27. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 25, art. 1(A)(2).    
28. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [here-
inafter 1967 Protocol].  
 
 
 
The Syrian Crisis Vol. 89 
 
781 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Convention limits application of the term “refugee” to those flee-
ing due to “events occurring before 1 January 1951” and provides an op-
tion to States parties of further limiting the definition to those fleeing due 
to “events occurring in Europe.”29 A similar definition, although not re-
stricted to events occurring in Europe or before 1951, is incorporated into 
the Statue of the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refu-
gees (UNHCR Statute).30 Rather than creating a new definition, the 1967 
Protocol commits States parties to implementing Article 1(A)2 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention without the chronological (events occurring prior to 
1951) or geographic (events occurring in Europe) restrictions,31 save where 
the geographic limitation is explicitly preserved by States parties to the Pro-
tocol.32  
The principle of non-refoulement, or the prohibition on forced return, 
found in 1951 Refugee Convention is integral to any discussion of entry for 
those fleeing persecution:  
 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion; 
 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a 
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to 
the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted 
by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to 
the community of that country. 33 
 
                                                                                                                      
29. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 25, art. 1(B)(1): 
 
For the purposes of this Convention, the words “events occurring before 1 January 1951” 
in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either (a) "events occurring in Europe 
before 1 January 1951”; or (b) “events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 
1951”; and each Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratifi-
cation or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its 
obligations under this Convention.   
 
30. Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
G.A. Res. 428 (V), art. 6(A)(ii), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 46 U.N. Doc. 
A/1775 (Dec. 14, 1950) [hereinafter UNHCR Statute], art. 6(B); for a concise explanation 
of the differences between the UNHCR Statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention see 
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 12 n. 56 (1991). 
31. 1967 Protocol, supra note 28, art. 1(2). 
32. Id., art. 1(3). 
33. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 25, art. 33. 
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As an injunction framed in “negative terms,”34 the non-refoulement provi-
sions of the 1951 Convention do not provide a right of entry per se. How-
ever, insofar as admission to the territory of the asylum State will, in prac-
tice, often be the only way to avoid returning an asylum-seeker to the 
“frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened,”35 
this will frequently amount to a de facto right of admission.36 
However, of the five key reception States surrounding Syria, only 
Egypt and Turkey are States parties to either the 1951 Refugee Convention 
or the 1967 Protocol to the Convention37 and only Lebanon and Turkey 
have passed domestic laws governing the definition and protection of asy-
lum-seekers and refugees.38 Although there are now 144 States parties to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and 145 to the 1967 Protocol, countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region continue to have a very 
low rate of accession to either treaty. In large part this is due to the contin-
uing concern among Arab States with the issue of Palestinian refugees. 
In fact, Arab States supported the exclusion of Palestinian refugees 
from the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the UNHCR Stat-
ute.39 These States were concerned that if Palestinian refugees were includ-
ed in the terms of either document they “would become submerged [with 
other categories of refugees] and would be relegated to a position of minor 
importance.”40 The 1951 Refugee Convention establishes a model of pro-
tection in displacement based on the fundamental right of non-refoulement. In 
contrast with the fear of persecution and the right of non-refoulement that 
                                                                                                                      
34. Applicant M38/2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
[2003] FCR 131, ¶ 39 (Austl.). 
35. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 25, art. 33. 
36. James C. Hathaway, Refugees and Asylum, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION LAW 177, 193 (Brian Opeskin, Richard Perruchoud & Jillyanne Redpath, eds., 
2012). 
37. UNHCR States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
1967 Protocol, as of Apr. 1, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73 
b0d63.pdf. 
38. Law on Foreigners, supra note 26; Loi réglementant l'entrée et le séjour des étrangers au 
Liban ainsi que leur sortie de ce pays (Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Leb-
anon and their Exit from the Country (Law of Entry and Exit) Bulletin de Législation 
Libanaise (Journal Officiel), 1962, No. 28-1962, art. 26 (Leb.). 
39. OROUB EL-ABED, UNPROTECTED: PALESTINIANS IN EGYPT SINCE 1948 163 
(2009); 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 25, art. 1(d); UNHCR Statute, supra note 32, 
art. 7(c). 
40. LEX TAKKENBERG, THE STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN INTERNATION-
AL LAW 66 (1998). 
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concerns many asylum-seekers, Palestinian refugees demand a right to re-
turn to Palestine in line with the terms of General Assembly Resolution 
194.41 Arab States have been hesitant to accede to the Convention as, in 
part, it fails to present a model of protection relevant to the needs of Pales-
tinians.42  
 
A. Egypt and Lebanon 
 
Although Egypt is a party to both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 
1967 Protocol, it has not yet promulgated relevant domestic asylum law or 
developed the procedures or institutions necessary to comply with their 
obligations under the Convention.43 In accordance with a memorandum of 
understanding signed with the UNHCR in 1954 the government has de-
volved virtually all aspects of refugee protection, including the provision of 
social welfare and status determination, to the UNHCR.44 
The provisions of the 1962 Lebanese law are restricted quite specifical-
ly to granting political asylum only45 and so would most likely exclude any 
claims made by the Syrians fleeing civil disorder and violence in their own 
country. However, this remains a matter of speculation as no steps have 
been taken to implement these provisions through either the promulgation 
of regulations or the development of State institutions for the determina-
                                                                                                                      
41.  G.A. Res. 194 (III), ¶ 11 U.N. Doc. A/RES/194 (III) (Dec. 11, 1948): 
 
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compen-
sation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or 
damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be 
made good by the Governments or authorities responsible. 
 
See also Ben Lynfield, As Peace Talks Pick Up, Palestinians Demand a Return to Villages Fled 
Long Ago, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
World/Middle-East/2013/0818/As-peace-talks-pick-up-Palestinians-demand-a-return-to-
villages-fled-long-ago. 
42. Jaber Suleiman, Trapped Refugees: the Case of Palestinians in Lebanon, in NO REFUGE: 
PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 11 (Refugee Studies Centre, Working Paper Series No. 64, 
2010), http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/working-papers-folder_contents/RSCwork 
ingpaper64.pdf. 
43. Global Report 2012: Egypt, UNHCR, http://www.refworld.org/docid 
/4e52379612.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
44. Michael Kagan, “We Live in a Country of UNHCR”: The UN Surrogate State and Refu-
gee Policy in the Middle East, (UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper 
No. 201, Feb. 2011), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d8876db2.html. 
45. Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners, supra note 40, art. 26. 
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tion of refugee claims and/or the protection of asylum-seekers. As such, 
the Lebanese State continues to treat all asylum-seekers as, in essence, ille-
gal immigrants and extends its protection to them on a wholly discretionary 
basis.46 
 
B. The New Turkish Law on Foreigners 
 
While Turkey has acceded to the 1967 Protocol it continues to limit its pro-
tection obligations to those persons fleeing persecution as a result of 
“events occurring in Europe.”47 This restriction, reflected in the new Turk-
ish law, excludes those fleeing the Syrian conflict.48 However, the new law 
introduces an, admittedly discretionary, provision for the temporary pro-
tection of individuals in the context of mass influx.49 There is also provi-
sion for the subsidiary protection of individuals who do not come within 
                                                                                                                      
46. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ROT HERE OR DIE THERE: BLEAK CHOICES FOR IRAQI 
REFUGEES IN LEBANON 16 (2007), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports 
/lebanon1207.pdf:  
 
Lebanon treats people who enter illegally to seek asylum, or who enter legally but then 
overstay their visas for the same purpose, as illegal immigrants who are subject to impris-
onment, fines, and deportation. The situation improved significantly with the September 
2003 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Lebanon’s General Security and 
UNHCR. While the MOU declares that “Lebanon does not consider itself as an asylum 
country” and that “the only viable durable solution for refugees recognized under the 
mandate of UNHCR is resettlement in a third country,” the MOU seeks to provide “tem-
porary humanitarian solutions for the problems of people entering clandestinely, residing 
unlawfully in Lebanon and submitting asylum applications at UNHCR. 
 
47. 1967 Protocol, supra note 28, art. 1(3); States Parties, supra note 39, at 5; JAMES C. 
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (2005); Dilek 
Latif, Refugee Policy of the Turkish Republic, 33 TURKISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 1 (2002).  
48. Law on Foreigners, supra note 26, art. 61: 
  
A person who as a result of events occurring in European countries and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationali-
ty and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the pro-
tection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his or her former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it shall be recognized as a refugee following the refugee sta-
tus determination procedures. 
  
49. Id., art. 91(1) (“Temporary protection may be provided to foreigners who, having 
been forced to leave their country and cannot return to the country they left, have arrived 
at or crossed the borders of Turkey in masses seeking emergency and temporary protec-
tion.”) (emphasis added). 
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the terms of the domestic refugee definition. Individuals who may face 
“the death penalty or execution,”50 torture or inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment”51 or a “serious threat to his or her person by reason 
of indiscriminate violence”52 upon return to his or her country of origin, 
are protected by the law.  
Like the 1951 Refugee Convention itself, the Turkish law has a stand-
alone non-refoulement provision. Unfortunately, however, it is framed in a 
manner so inconsistent with the other elements of the law as to be virtually 
inscrutable. Article 4 of the new law forbids return “to a place where he or 
she may be subject to torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treat-
ment, or where his or her life or freedom may be under threat.”53 However, 
while Article 4 purports to extend this guarantee to all individuals who fall 
“under the scope of this Law,”’54 it goes on to limit the actual effect of the 
non-refoulement provision to those individuals whose “life or freedom may be 
under threat on account of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion.”55 This clause appears to re-
strict the provision’s application to those defined as refugees in Article 61 
of the law, thereby excluding individuals granted subsidiary protection pur-
suant to Article 63 or temporary protection pursuant to Article 91 from its 
gamut. As will be recalled, the refugee definition in Article 61 is itself lim-
ited to those fleeing “events occurring in Europe,” but this restriction is 
not reflected in Article 4. The end result is that the Article 4 non-refoulement 
provision is in some way inconsistent with each of the new law’s qualifica-
tion provisions.  
It is difficult to understand at this stage whether the terms of the new 
law reflect a considered legislative scheme or is merely the result of poor 
and inconsistent drafting. One possibility is that the non-refoulement provi-
sion (insofar as it excludes the “geographical limitation”) is intended to be 
                                                                                                                      
50. Id., art. 63(1)(a). 
51. Id., art. 63(1)(b); cf Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
52. Law on Foreigners, supra note 26, art. 63(1)(c); cf Council Directive 2011/95/EU 
on Standards for the Qualification of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as 
Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a Uniform Status for Refugees or for Persons 
Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the Protection Granted (Recast), 
art. 15, 2011 O.J. (L 337); C-465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 2009 E.C.R. I-
00921 [hereinafter EU Qualification Directive].   
53. Law on Foreigners, supra note 26, art. 4. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
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broader in scope than the Article 61 qualification provision. However, in 
that case it is hard to see what advantage there is in retaining this limitation 
in respect of the qualification provision itself. Moreover, there seems little 
point in adding further grounds for subsidiary protection in Articles 63 and 
91 if those in receipt of such protection do not benefit from the guarantee 
against non-refoulement.  
Until this law is implemented by the Turkish State its practical effect 
will remain a matter of speculation. However, the process of implementa-
tion bears careful scrutiny, particularly in respect to those seeking protec-
tion due to a “serious threat to [their] person by reason of indiscriminate 
violence.”56 Should Article 4, as implemented, give protection from re-
foulement to those entitled to subsidiary protection within the meaning of 
this article (and, by extension, a de facto right of entry), this will mark the 
development of a key resource for the protection of individuals fleeing civil 
disorder in the Middle East. 
 
C. The “Nexus Requirement” 
 
Any regime for the protection of individuals fleeing the violence in Syria 
premised on either the 1951 Convention or the domestic law of the key 
receiving States suffers from two key protection gaps. First, as noted, only 
two out of the five States (Egypt and Turkey) are States parties to the two 
key international refugee protection instruments; neither of which has, as 
yet, begun to implement the instruments in a comprehensive manner. Sec-
ond, even where the provisions of these instruments bind the receiving 
States, it remains unclear whether Syrians seeking protection in these States 
will have refugee claims consistent with the requirements of Article 1(A)2 
of the 1951 Convention.57 This latter issue warrants further discussion, par-
ticularly in light of the UNHCR’s recent approach with respect to those 
fleeing the Syrian conflict. 
In order to qualify for refugee status under the Article 1(A)2 definition, 
the “well-founded fear of persecution” must be “for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 
The persecution feared must be causally related to one of the grounds 
                                                                                                                      
56. Id., art. 63(1)(c). 
57. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 25, art. 1(A)(2). See discussion at sec-
tion II.    
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enumerated in Article 1(A)2.58 This is commonly referred to as the “causal 
nexus.”59 While some Syrians have certainly fled their country due to a 
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of religion60 or political opin-
ion,61 in accordance with Article 1(A)2 of the Refugee Convention, many 
will have fled due to their fear of generalized violence and civil disorder 
unrelated to a Convention ground. The question is, can this “causal nexus” 
be established as a result of generalized violence? 
This is not to suggest, however, that there is a requirement to show a 
differential impact on those fleeing civil situations of conflict of large-scale 
civil disorder or that such a finding is limited to any particular number of 
individuals.62 There is no basis in the text of the 1951 Convention to im-
pose a higher or differential burden on claimants seeking to make out a 
claim to refugee status in the context of armed conflict.63 Moreover, while 
the Convention ground must contribute meaningfully to the cause of the 
persecution feared, it need not be the sole or even the predominant cause 
of that persecution.64  
                                                                                                                      
58. James C. Hathaway, The Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground, 23 
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 211, 213, ¶ 1 (2002) [hereinafter Michigan 
Guidelines]. 
59. Id., at 219, ¶ 17. 
60. Patrick Cockburn, Persecution of the Christians: Syrian Minority Fear the End of Fighting 
More than War Itself, THE INDEPENDENT (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk 
/news/world/middle-east/persecution-of-the-christians-syrian-minority-fear-the-end-of-
fighting-more-than-war-itself-8422977.html; Clarissa Ward, Syria's Christians Fearing Reli-
gious Persecution, CBS NEWS (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch 
/?id=50141509n. 
61. Syria: Political Detainees Tortured, Killed, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/03/syria-political-detainees-tortured-killed. 
62. UNHCR, Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi 
Asylum-Seekers 133 (2007), http://www.refworld.org/docid/46deb05557.html (“Whole 
communities may risk or suffer persecution for Convention reasons. The fact that all 
members of the community are equally affected does not in any way undermine the legit-
imacy of any particular individual claim.”); Michigan Guidelines, supra note 60, at 218, ¶ 
16; Michael Kagan and William P. Johnson, Persecution in the Fog of War: The House of Lords' 
Decision in Adan, 23(2) MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (2002). 
63. Vanessa Holzer, The 1951 Refugee Convention and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Con-
flict and Other Situations of Violence, UNHCR Division of International Protection Legal and 
Protection Policy Research Series 16, PPLA/2012/05 (Sept. 2012) 
http://www.unhcr.org/504748069.pdf. 
64. Michigan Guidelines, supra note 60, at 218, ¶ 13; Michelle Foster, Causation in Con-
text: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23(2) MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 265 (2002). 
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The significance of a particular ground is to be judged subjectively by 
reference to the perspective of the persecutor (rather than the refugee).65 It 
is the views of the persecutor that are relevant for establishing the causal 
nexus and determining the reasons that motivate particular conduct (i.e., 
acts of persecution).66 This follows from the wording of Article 1(A)2, 
which requires the persecution to be “for reasons of” a Convention 
ground. It is irrelevant for the purposes of establishing the nexus whether 
the particular ground is true or has merely been imputed to the refugee 
(rightly or wrongly) or, indeed, whether the ground of persecution is 
known to the refugee at all.67 If a persecutor acts on a belief related to an 
enumerated Convention ground then this suffices to establish the causal 
nexus regardless of whether that belief is mistaken or, indeed, implausible.68 
Finally, it must be emphasized that the standards relevant to the deter-
mination of the causal nexus are general and no particular or special re-
quirements apply where the refugees originate from a country in which 
there is widespread violence or civil disorder. While asylum-seekers from a 
country in this position are not automatically refugees, they are entitled to 
recognition on the same terms as any asylum-seeker where they meet the 
requirements of Article 1(A)2.69 Indeed, in the view of UNHCR,  
 
most Syrians seeking international protection are likely to fulfil the re-
quirements of the refugee definition contained in Article 1A(2) of the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, since they will have a 
well-founded fear of persecution linked to one of the Convention 
                                                                                                                      
65. Andreas Zimmermann and Claudia Mahler, Art. 1 A para. 2, in THE 1951 CON-
VENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL: A COM-
MENTARY 281, ¶ 426 (Andreas Zimmerman, ed., 2011); Attorney General v. Ward [1993] 
2 S.C.R. 689, 747 (Can.). 
66. Zimmerman and Mahler, supra note 67, ¶ 427. 
67. GUY GOODWIN-GILL AND JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 87 (2007); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No.1: 
Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶¶ 22–23, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 
2002); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 6: Religion-
Based Refugee Claims under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/04/06 (Apr. 28. 2004); U.N. High 
Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 8: Child Asylum Claims under 
Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, ¶¶ 46–47, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/09/08 (Sept. 22, 2009). 
68. Zimmerman and Mahler, supra note 67, ¶ 428. 
69. Michigan Guidelines, supra note 60, at 219, ¶ 17. 
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grounds. For many civilians who have fled Syria, the nexus to a 1951 
Convention ground will lie in the direct or indirect, real or perceived as-
sociation with one of the parties to the conflict.70 
 
If one takes the subjectivity of the Convention grounds seriously it will 
admit of the sweeping and even erratic imputation of particular grounds to 
broad sections of a community. The question is not whether such imputa-
tions are accurate or even plausible but whether they serve to motivate the 
conduct of the persecutors. As UNHCR explains in reference to Syria,   
 
parties to the conflict reportedly employ broad interpretations of whom 
they may consider as being associated with the other party, including 
based on an individual’s family links, religious or ethnic background or 
mere presence in an area considered as being “pro-” or “anti-
Government.” This is illustrated by the methods and tactics of warfare 
that have been documented in Syria and include, inter alia, the systematic 
besieging, bombarding, raiding, pillaging and destruction of residences 
and other civilian infrastructure in whole neighbourhoods, purportedly 
for reason of real or perceived support to the other conflict party.71 
 
This account is both plausible and laudably sensitive to the particular 
conditions of the Syrian conflict. It is consistent with the subjectivity of the 
Convention grounds to admit of their attribution on even very general 
terms. Certainly this would include the grounds provided by the UNHCR, 
of “family links, religious or ethnic background or mere presence in an ar-
ea.” In any case, there is not yet a settled body of case law in respect of 
their refugee status. As such, any conclusions as to the correct application 
of the causal nexus in this context must remain somewhat speculative.   
 
III. NO REGIONAL PROTECTION INSTRUMENT 
 
The protection situation is aggravated by the absence of a regional refugee 
instrument akin to the European Union (EU) Qualification Directive72 or 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention.73 These 
                                                                                                                      
70. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, International Protection Considerations with Regard to 
People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update II, ¶ 14 (Oct. 22, 2013), www.refworld.org/ 
docid/5265184f4.html. 
71. International Protection Considerations Syria, supra note 72, at 8, n.56. 
72. EU Qualification Directive, supra note 54. 
73. Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific As-
pects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45. 
 
 
 
 International Law Studies 2013 
790 
 
 
 
 
 
 
both make specific provision for the protection of individuals fleeing large-
scale violence or civil disorder, albeit in somewhat different terms.74 There 
is, in fact, a draft Arab League Refugee Convention75 which makes provi-
sion for the protection of individuals displaced “. . . because of sustained 
aggression against, occupation and foreign domination of such country or 
because of the occurrence of natural disasters or grave events resulting in 
major disruption of public order.”76 However, this Convention has never 
enjoyed significant political support in the Arab world and no State has yet 
ratified it.77 As such, it remains in draft form with little prospect of change 
in the foreseeable future.  
 
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
The available protection regime can be significantly enhanced by reference 
to general standards of international human rights law. Of particular im-
portance in this context are the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR)78 and the Convention against Torture (CAT).79 All of 
the five key receiving States are parties to both conventions.80 The conven-
                                                                                                                      
74. EU Qualification Directive, supra note 54, art. 15(c): 
 
Serious harm consists of: (a) the death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious 
and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in 
situations of international or internal armed conflict. 
 
OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 75, art. 1(2):  
 
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part 
or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of ha-
bitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or 
nationality. 
  
75. League of Arab States, Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab 
Countries 1994, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4dd5123f2.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
76. Id., art. 1. 
77. Suleiman, supra note 44, at 16. 
78. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
79. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
80. A complete list of States party to the CAT and the ICCPR can be found on the 
website of the United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://treaties.un.org (last visited Oct. 
9, 2013). 
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tions contain absolute and non-derogable81 rights against torture82 and, in 
the case of the ICCPR, the arbitrary deprivation of life.83 Significantly, the 
CAT includes an explicit right against non-refoulement in Article 3(1): 
 
No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to an-
other State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 
 
Moreover, the Human Rights Committee has found a guarantee against 
refoulement to be implicit in the meaning of Article 7 of the ICCPR. 84  
The guarantees contained in both the ICCPR and the CAT go consid-
erably beyond torture per se to address a broader variety and degree of ill-
treatment. This is important to note in the context of forced displacement, 
as both conventions extend the assurances against refoulement to situations 
where ill-treatment is feared. The (non-derogable) Article 1 guarantee 
                                                                                                                      
81. CAT, supra note 81, art. 2(2); ICCPR, supra note 80, art. 4(2). See also Committee 
against Torture General Comment 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev.4, ¶ 5 (2007): 
 
Article 2, paragraph 2, provides that the prohibition against torture is absolute and non-
derogable. It emphasizes that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked by a State 
Party to justify acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction. The Convention iden-
tifies as among such circumstances, a state of war or threat thereof, internal political in-
stability or any other public emergency. This includes any threat of terrorist acts or violent 
crime as well as armed conflict, international or non-international.   
 
82. CAT, supra note 81, arts. 1, 2; ICCPR, supra note 80, art. 7. 
83. ICCPR, supra note 80, art. 6. 
84. U.N. Human Rights Committee General Comment 20: Article 7 (44th Sess.), 
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30, ¶ 9 (1992):  
 
In the view of the Committee, States parties must not expose individuals to the danger of 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another 
country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement. States parties should indi-
cate in their reports what measures they have adopted to that end. 
 
U.N. Human Rights Committee General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obli-
gation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (80th Sess.) U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶ 12 (1994): 
 
. . . the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the Covenant 
rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control entails an obliga-
tion not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable 
harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, either in the country 
to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequent-
ly be removed.  
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against torture85 in the CAT is supplemented by the broader (albeit, 
derogable) Article 16 guarantees against “cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment,”86 while Article 7 of the ICCPR incorporates both elements into 
a non-derogable guarantee against ill-treatment.87 The Committee against 
Torture88 and the Committee on Human Rights89 have sought to minimize 
any potential distinctions among the various categories of ill-treatment. The 
Committee against Torture, in particular, has emphasized that the obliga-
tion to prevent all forms of ill-treatment addressed by the CAT are inter-
dependent, indivisible and interrelated.90 As explained in its General Com-
ment 2,  
 
. . . the definitional threshold between ill-treatment and torture is often 
not clear. Experience demonstrates that the conditions that give rise to ill-
treatment frequently facilitate torture and therefore the measures required 
to prevent torture must be applied to prevent ill-treatment. Accordingly, 
the Committee has considered the prohibition of ill-treatment to be like-
wise non-derogable under the Convention and its prevention to be an ef-
fective and non-derogable measure.91 
 
                                                                                                                      
85. CAT, supra note 81, art. 1:  
 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term “torture” means any act by which severe 
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, pun-
ishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having com-
mitted, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.  
 
86. CAT, supra note 81, art. 16:  
 
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts 
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture 
as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
 
87. ICCPR, supra note 80, art. 7 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected 
without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”). 
88. Committee against Torture General Comment 2, supra note 83, ¶ 3. 
89. U.N. Human Rights Committee General Comment 20, supra note 86, ¶ 4: 
 
The Covenant does not contain any definition of the concepts covered by article 7, nor 
does the Committee consider it necessary to draw up a list of prohibited acts or to estab-
lish sharp distinctions between the different kinds of punishment or treatment; the dis-
tinctions depend on the nature, purpose and severity of the treatment applied. 
 
90. Committee against Torture General Comment 2, supra note 83, ¶ 3. 
91. Id., ¶ 3. 
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The guarantee against the arbitrary deprivation of life found in Article 6 
of the ICCPR is equally broad in scope. While Article 6 itself refers to both 
the death penalty92 and the crime of genocide,93 the Committee on Human 
Rights has evinced particular concern with the threat to life posed by 
armed conflict. As the Committee explains in its General Comment 6, 
 
The right to life enunciated in article 6 of the Covenant has been dealt 
with in all State reports. It is the supreme right from which no derogation 
is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of 
the nation (art. 4). However, the Committee has noted that quite often 
the information given concerning article 6 was limited to only one or oth-
er aspect of this right. It is a right which should not be interpreted nar-
rowly. 
 
The Committee observes that war and other acts of mass violence con-
tinue to be a scourge of humanity and take the lives of thousands of in-
nocent human beings every year . . . The Committee considers that States 
have the supreme duty to prevent wars, acts of genocide and other acts of 
mass violence causing arbitrary loss of life. Every effort they make to 
avert the danger of war, especially thermonuclear war, and to strengthen 
international peace and security would constitute the most important 
condition and guarantee for the safeguarding of the right to life.94  
 
The relevance of these provisions as interpreted to the current situation 
in Syria is plain given the widespread allegations of human rights abuses.95 
Both conventions contain guarantees against refoulement to situations where 
ill-treatment is feared. However, and as distinct from the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, there is no requirement to establish a causal nexus between 
the ill-treatment feared and the particular grounds or reasons for that ill-
treatment. The guarantees against ill-treatment in both the CAT and the 
ICCPR, including the rights of non-refoulement, are absolute and unrelated to 
                                                                                                                      
92. ICCPR, supra note 80, art. 6(2). 
93. Id., art. 6(3). 
94. U.N. Human Rights Committee General Comment 6: Article 6 (16th Sess.) U.N. 
Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1, ¶¶ 1–2 (1982). 
95. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TORTURE ARCHIPELAGO: ARBITRARY ARRESTS, TOR-
TURE, AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES IN SYRIA’S UNDERGROUND PRISONS SINCE 
MARCH 2011 (2012): http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria0712webw 
cover.pdf; Stephanie Nebehay, Syrian Forces Responsible for Banias Massacres: UN Report, 
REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/us-syria-crisis-
warcrimes-idUSBRE98A0D5 20130911. 
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any particular grounds or causes. The breadth of these guarantees makes 
them especially valuable in situations of armed conflict where assessing the 
reasons or motivations relevant to the causal nexus can be particularly dif-
ficult. 
 
V. A PARALLEL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL NORM 
 
Running alongside these conventional norms is a broad customary interna-
tional norm of non-refoulement.96 This will continue to bind States even after 
they accede to a treaty that to some degree reflects the customary interna-
tional norm.97 In this case the norms run in parallel to one another and, 
assuming they are not inconsistent,98 may be applied in the alternative.99 
Inevitably the two categories of norms will be closely related, with conven-
tional norms serving as the clearest possible evidence of the opinio juris of 
States.100 As calculated by Bethlehem and Lauterpacht, “170 of the 189 
members of the UN, or around 90 per cent of the membership, are party 
to one or more conventions which include non-refoulement as an essential 
                                                                                                                      
96. As early as 1977 the UN Executive Committee (ExComm) on the International 
Protection of Refugees noted that “. . . the fundamental humanitarian principle of non-
refoulement has found expression in various international instruments adopted at the uni-
versal and regional levels and is generally accepted by States.” U.N. ExComm Conclusion 
No. 6 (XXVIII) Non-Refoulement (28th Sess.) ¶ (a) (1977). In 1981 ExComm concluded, 
in the context of a “large-scale influx,” that “[i]n all cases the fundamental principle of 
non-refoulement including non-rejection at the frontier-must be scrupulously observed.” 
U.N. ExComm Conclusion No. 22 (XXXII) Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations 
of Large Scale Influx (32d Sess.) ¶ II(A)2 (1981). By 1982 ExComm stated that the princi-
ple of non-refoulement “. . . was progressively acquiring the character of a peremptory 
rule of international law.” U.N. ExComm Conclusion No. 25 (XXXIII) General (33d 
Sess.) ¶ (b). (1982). 
97. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 38, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 (“Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming 
binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such.”). 
98. Id., art. 64 (“If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any 
existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.”).  
99. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 
I.C.J. 392, ¶ 73 (Nov. 26); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 174–79 (July 27); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
(F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 64, 70–74 (Feb. 20).  
100. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–10 (7th ed. 
2008). 
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component.”101 Significantly, these calculations include the wide variety of 
conventions such as the European Convention on Human Rights102, the 
OAU Refugee Convention,103 the American Convention on Human 
Rights104 and the Banjul Charter105 that make provision for non-refoulement 
(either explicitly or as interpreted) outside the strict definition of refugee in 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and in respect of torture and threats to life.  
As such,  
 
the evidence points overwhelmingly to a broad formulation of the prohi-
bition as including torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. With the exception of the Torture Convention, these ele-
ments all appear in human rights instruments of both a binding and a 
non-binding nature as features of a single prohibition.106  
 
So, and in parallel to the right of non-refoulement as found in both the 
ICCPR and CAT, the customary norm does not require a causal nexus to 
be established between the ill-treatment feared and the motivations of the 
persecuting actor. Correspondingly, the customary right is considerably 
broader than the right of non-refoulement found in Article 33 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention. This is significant in the present case as it appears 
that both the right to protection against torture,107 and non-refoulement more 
generally,108 have now attained the status of preemptory/ius cogens norms of 
                                                                                                                      
101. Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of 
Non-Refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR'S 
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 87, 147 (Erika Feller, 
Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003). 
102. ECHR, supra note 53. 
103. OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 75. 
104. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A. S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 2 (July 18, 1978).  
105. Organization of African Unity, African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 
21, 1986). 
106. Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, supra note 103, at 152. 
107. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom (No.2), ¶ 61, App. No. 35763/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2001); Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶¶ 155–57 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). Erica De Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as 
an International Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15(1) 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (2004). 
108. U.N. ExComm Conclusion No. 79 (XLVII) General (47th Sess.) ¶ (i) (1996) 
(“the principle of non-refoulement is not subject to derogation.”); U.N. ExComm Con-
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public international law. In addition to being generally applicable as norms 
of customary international law, these are also now supervening norms to 
which no derogation is permitted.  
 
VI. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
A. An International Armed Conflict 
 
There is one further resource for the protection of persons displaced from 
Syria, which although somewhat more remote from conventional human 
rights and refugee discourse, must also be taken into account. Both the 
Third109 and Fourth110 Geneva Conventions contain explicit prohibitions of 
refoulement. All of the five key receiving countries are parties to all four Ge-
neva Conventions.111 In addition, all four conventions are now widely ac-
cepted to have passed in their entirety into customary international law.112 
Article 12 of the Third Geneva Convention provides in part that, 
 
Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a 
Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power 
has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power 
to apply the Convention . . . .113 
 
Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that, 
 
Protected persons shall not be transferred to a Power which is not a party 
to the Convention . . . .  
                                                                                                                      
clusion No. 25, supra note 98, ¶ (b); Jean Allain, The Ius Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement 
13(4) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 533 (2001). 
109. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Oct. 21, 
1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. 
110. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
111. A complete list of the State parties to the main international humanitarian law 
treaties is maintained by the ICRC and may be found at,  http://www.icrc.org/ihl/%28 
SPF%29/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2013). 
112. David Turns, The Law of Armed Conflict (International Humanitarian Law), in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 814, 816 (Malcom D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010); Partial Award on Prisoners 
of War, Eritrea's Claim (Eri. v. Eth.) 42 I.L.M. 1056, 1083 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n 
2003). 
113. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 111, art. 12. 
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Protected persons may be transferred by the Detaining Power only to a 
Power which is a party to the present Convention and after the Detaining 
Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee 
Power to apply the present Convention . . . . 
 
In no circumstances shall a protected person be transferred to a country 
where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her politi-
cal opinions or religious beliefs . . . .114 
 
While Article 12 of the Third Geneva Convention applies only to pris-
oners of war,115 Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to 
State party nationals that find themselves under the control of either a 
“party to the conflict or occupying power of which they are not nation-
als.”116 As distinct from the more limited guarantees against refoulement 
found in general asylum and human rights law, the protections in these ar-
ticles extend to all situations in which the transferee power is not willing and 
able to apply the terms of the conventions as a whole. Furthermore, in respect of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention only, the protections apply to situations in 
which the protected person might have reason to fear persecution on polit-
ical or religious grounds. This last provision thus serves to import a condi-
tion similar to the “nexus requirement” in international refugee law.117 
Of course, the terms of Geneva Conventions III and IV, with the ex-
ception of Common Article 3, apply only in the context of an international 
armed conflict or following a “partial or total occupation of the territory of 
a High Contracting Party. . . .”118 There is no suggestion that Syria or, in-
deed, any of the five key receiving States, is the subject of either an interna-
tional armed conflict as defined in Common Article 2 or a continuing oc-
                                                                                                                      
114. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 112, art. 45. 
115. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 111, art. 4. 
116. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 112, art. 4: 
 
Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any man-
ner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Par-
ty to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. Nationals of a State 
which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a neutral State 
who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent 
State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they are nation-
als has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are. 
  
117. See discussion at section II(C). 
118. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 111, art. 2; Fourth Geneva Convention, 
supra note 112, art. 2. 
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cupation. However, should, as has been widely discussed in recent 
months,119 a foreign State intervene to oppose Syrian government forces, 
the conflict will become “internationalised” within the meaning of Com-
mon Article 2. States that become parties to the conflict will then be bound 
to apply the non-refoulement provisions of the conventions in respect of both 
POWs and State party nationals under their control.  
 
B. A Non-International Armed Conflict 
 
Common Article 3 applies in the context of a non-international armed con-
flict120 and there seems little question that the conflict in Syria has now 
reached the level of a civil war.121 Although this Article does not contain an 
explicit prohibition of non-refoulement it does feature a broad variety of guar-
antees against ill-treatment, including in part,  
 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutila-
tion, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment122 
 
There is an obvious analogy with the breadth of the protections found 
in Articles 6123 and 7124 of the ICCPR as interpreted by the Human Rights 
Committee in their General Comment 20.125 Further, the language adopted 
by each convention with respect to the general duties of State parties is 
largely identical. Both Article 2 of the ICCPR126 and Common Article 2 of 
                                                                                                                      
119. Mark Landler, Obama Threatens Force Against Syria NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 20, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/world/middleeast/obama-threatens-force-
against-syria.html?_r=0. 
120. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 111, art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, 
supra note 112, art. 3. 
121. ICRC 2012 Annual Report, supra note 10. 
122. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 111, art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, 
supra note 112, art. 3. 
123. ICCPR, supra note 80, art. 6. 
124. Id., art. 7. 
125. U.N. Human Rights Committee General Comment 20, supra note 86, ¶ 9. 
126. ICCPR, supra note 80, art. 2: 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all indi-
viduals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the pre-
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the Geneva Conventions127 require States to “respect and ensure” the rights 
recognized in each convention. This formula provides the basis for the non-
refoulement obligation in Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR as explained by the 
Human Rights Committee in their General Comment 31.128 The ICCPR 
and Common Article 3 feature absolute and non-derogable prohibitions of 
torture and ill-treatment and the corollary State duties to “respect and en-
sure” these rights are found in both documents in similar terms. As such, 
there is every reason to find an identical non-refoulement obligation in respect 
of Common Article 3.129 This obligation will apply to all State parties in-
volved in the Syrian conflict.  
It is likely that this obligation already applies in respect of Iran. As has 
been widely reported, the Iranian Quds Force is now actively involved in 
the Syrian conflict.130 As a result, a duty of non-refoulement according to the 
terms of Common Article 3 now lies against the Iranian State in respect of 
any Syrian nationals in their control. The same obligation will arise against 
other States as a corollary of their military involvement in Syria. As States 
involve themselves in the on-going military conflict in Syria an obligation 
of non-refoulement will arise in respect of any Syrian nationals in their control. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
At first blush, there might seem to be inadequate resources for the effective 
legal protection of Syrians displaced to its surrounding States. Few of the 
key receiving States are parties to either the 1951 Geneva Convention or 
the 1967 Protocol and none have a functioning domestic asylum system. 
Where asylum-seekers are registered and claims are determined, this is gen-
erally done by UNHCR staff on the basis of an agreement with the host 
                                                                                                                      
sent Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
 
127. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 111, art. 1; Fourth Geneva Convention, 
supra note 112, art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure 
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”).  
128. U.N. Human Rights Committee General Comment 31, supra note 86, ¶ 12. 
129. Cordula Droege, Transfers of Detainees: Legal Framework, Non-Refoulement and Con-
temporary Challenges, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 669, 675 (2008). 
130. Dexter Filkins, The Shadow Commander, THE NEW YORKER, 42, 44 (Sept. 30, 
2013) http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_filkins; Footage 
Claims to Show Iranians in Syria, BBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk 
/news/world-middle-east-24103801. 
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State.131 Although Turkey has now passed a comprehensive asylum law it 
remains, as of yet, unimplemented.132 As such, any effect it will have on the 
domestic protection regime for those fleeing the violence in Syria must re-
main largely a matter of speculation.   
Nevertheless, further examination of the international human rights 
and humanitarian law related to the principle of non-refoulement discloses a 
series of key resources for the protection of Syrians displaced abroad. This 
includes the absolute and non-derogable guarantees against ill-treatment 
found in the CAT and the ICCPR together with the corollary State duty of 
non-refoulement explicit in Article 3 of the CAT and, as interpreted, in Arti-
cles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR by the Committee on Human Rights.133 The ex-
plicit guarantees against non-refoulement found in Article 12 of the Third Ge-
neva Convention and Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention also 
provide guarantees. While these provisions will be relevant only to an in-
ternationalized armed conflict they deserve particular attention given the 
continuing prospect of military intervention in Syria against the Assad re-
gime by key Western States.134  
Immediately relevant, however, is Common Article 3, as interpreted by 
analogy with the reasoning of the Human Rights Committee in respect of 
Articles 2, 6 and 7 of the ICCPR, to include the right of non-refoulement. All 
of the key receiving States are parties to the four Geneva Conventions and 
there is little doubt that Syria is now in a state of non-international armed 
conflict. Indeed, as the Geneva Conventions have passed as a whole into 
international customary law, their terms will bind any State that seeks to 
intervene in the Syrian conflict, regardless of whether they are a party to 
the conventions.   
Taken together, the standards found in general international human 
rights and humanitarian law provide the foundation for an aggressive cam-
paign of advocacy to both receiving States and those States now exploring 
prospects for military intervention in Syria. As a result of its military in-
volvement in Syria, Iran is already bound by the non-refoulement duties im-
plicit in Common Article 3. Other States must understand that, should they 
                                                                                                                      
131. This continues to be the case in Lebanon, see Global Report 2012: Lebanon, UN-
HCR, http://www.refworld.org/docid/51c017e919.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
132. See the discussion in section II(B).  
133. See the discussion in section IV. 
134. Robert Winnett and Peter Dominiczak, Pressure on Cameron for New Vote on Syria 
Strikes, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews 
/middleeast/syria/10279620/Pressure-on-Cameron-for-new-vote-on-Syria-strikes.html . 
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choose to involve themselves in the Syrian conflict, they will assume a non-
refoulement obligation pursuant to both conventional and customary interna-
tional humanitarian law in respect of Syrian nationals under their control. 
This is in addition to the basic right of non-refoulement at international human 
rights and refugee law. 
Of course, any program of advocacy will be more effective when it 
combines practical assistance with exhortation. Recent violations of the 
right of non-refoulement, although troubling, should not distract attention 
from the extraordinary continuing burden on key receiving States and the 
challenges this poses authorities at all levels in delivering assistance and 
protection to the displaced. It is only common sense that, for States caught 
in the middle of the Syrian crisis, good advice will be welcomed only when 
it comes together with a helping hand. 
